22 01 21

Consider the cate­go­ry of desire that is the desire to make a sto­ny expres­sion break. Think of those humans who are attrac­tive for the pri­ma­ry rea­son of how the pre­sen­ta­tion of their face and body is impe­ne­trable or broo­ding or fierce or impas­sive with broo­ding fier­ce­ness. This cate­go­ry of desire is simple, slight­ly mecha­nis­tic : to pene­trate the broo­ding, fierce, impas­sive, impe­ne­trable pre­sen­ta­tion.

There are seve­ral ways to make a sto­ny expres­sion break. These include to enrage, to sur­prise, to humi­liate, to sad­den, and to give plea­sure. The experts at impas­sive expres­sion, howe­ver, are not so vul­ne­rable to sad­ness, rage, or humi­lia­tion : it is pre­ci­se­ly these expres­sions that they have prac­ti­ced steel looks against over many years, tes­ting their own faces always against their own afflic­tions. For eve­ry afflic­tion they endure they might think « And how may I use this afflic­tion to shar­pen my appea­rance of impas­si­vi­ty ? » For what, they conclude, is a humi­lia­tion if the humi­lia­tor does not suc­ceed in cas­ting down the eyes down­ward ? And what is sad­ness with no tears ? Or rage with no fla­shing eyes ? Those humans who are attrac­tive for the pri­ma­ry rea­son of the impe­ne­trable pre­sen­ta­tion of their face are attrac­tive for the rigor with which they self-culti­vate their impe­ne­tra­bi­li­ty. The experts at facial impas­si­vi­ty are the hard scien­tists of them­selves.

Surprise, while effec­tive at making the unbro­ken expres­sion break, is dif­fi­cult to achieve in this popu­la­tion. It takes prac­ti­ced unpre­dic­ta­bi­li­ty to sur­prise the expert of the unre­len­tin­gly unmo­ved face. The sur­pri­sed look, howe­ver, is a moment of intense satis­fac­tion for those who have the occa­sion to wit­ness it. In a sto­ny face sur­prise is some­thing like a rock slide––or if an excep­tio­nal example, as if a cliff face falls––and revea­led by this fall is an enti­re­ly new land­scape of uni­ma­gi­nable charm and elas­ti­ci­ty, one that prac­ti­cal­ly bounds with itself : mea­dows, flo­wers, small ani­mals, clear lakes ruf­fled by soft breezes.

Of all the rea­sons to test against a hard face, to watch it express its own plea­sure is the most com­pel­ling. Emily Dickinson des­cri­bed it : « It is a Vesuvian face. Had let its plea­sure through. » It is no mis­take that Dickinson ima­gi­ned the « plea­sure through » to be of the kind that could evis­ce­rate cities. This expres­sion of plea­sure, when let through this kind of face, has no small effect : it is exact­ly, too, like Dickinson sug­gests in the same poem, the firing of a gun : wha­te­ver is a not-nothing is the not-nothing of this event, which is real­ly unde­nia­bly some­thing, like any form of explo­sion. To achieve a look of plea­sure in a face which has prac­ti­ced itself against expres­sing open delight is always an his­to­ric accom­plish­ment in the his­to­ry of desires and faces.

This desire––to delight the unde­ligh­ted face––can com­pel an ambi­tious per­son to attempt to cause ano­ther plea­sure for years. « Might I break open their face with plea­sure ? » the ambi­tious appre­cia­tor of undoing impas­sive face asks, and fai­ling, tries again, and fai­ling, tries again, employing eve­ry wea­pon in the arse­nal of inter­per­so­nal plea­sures, until one day, if they are lucky, the plea­sure in the unplea­sed face is revea­led.

When the plea­sure arrives (as if a gun shot, vol­ca­no, dyna­mi­ted urban struc­ture, star which has implo­ded) it is unsur­pri­sing if an entire city must be devas­ta­ted into a monu­ment of that very moment, all things fro­zen under ash, lovers cur­led toge­ther, infants in mothers’ arms, bathers eter­nal­ly in baths––all neces­sa­ri­ly sacri­fi­ced to memo­ria­lize a moment when she or he or they who often appears beyond plea­sure dis­plays, in his or her or their face, a look of it.

to effect a num­ber of rapid changes on an alrea­dy rapid­ly chan­ging face

The impas­sive face has its rival : the face that can never hold still. The face is kine­tic, elas­tic, mor­pho­lo­gi­cal­ly indis­tinct, bloo­ming like frac­tals, the curse of digi­tal pho­to­gra­phers and bio-infor­ma­tio­nists who must try to fix, in data, what is in its very form unfixable. This face pro­vides an onrush of infor­ma­tion which comes so qui­ck­ly it almost evades pro­ces­sing : this face is pro­li­fic, a human come­dy of feeling––any one hour of rea­ding this face means one can read a Balzac’s worth of novels, also wit­ness a pro­jec­ted record of the gene­ric lega­cy of the human race (and beyond that, the pre-human ones), also wit­ness an ardent record of fee­ling in a bathe­tic lea­ping from the gro­tesque to the pre­cious to the sublime and wha­te­ver chi­me­ri­cal expres­sion of fee­ling results from quick leaps from one fee­ling to the next : the gro­tesque-deli­cate, the thought­ful-enra­ged, the dis­trac­ted-amu­sed.

These are the faces, which, like the avant-garde lite­ra­ture, must at once create their own texts and their own theo­ries of rea­ding them. For what are these faces without a unique cri­ti­cal infra­struc­ture new­ly inven­ted to inter­pret them ? These are the faces easi­ly mis­ta­ken for noise, like the sounds of traf­fic out­side the win­dow, so relent­less it soon becomes what you can’t hear.

The high­ly sen­si­tive fla­shing of these eyes might appear, without suf­fi­cient­ly deve­lo­ped methods of rea­ding, ran­dom, alea­to­ry, chao­tic. At their extreme, and like any com­plex thing, such rapid­ly fla­shing and elas­tic and rapid­ly expres­sing faces might be mis­ta­ken for disor­ga­ni­zed.

When they arrive without theo­ry, these faces are a delight to those enthral­led with enligh­ten­ment methods, who need a lot of things to cate­go­rize, who like to impose order, who are besot, like Fourier’s chil­dren, with the pas­sion to sort small things into use­ful piles1. Not acci­dent­ly, these faces are also of delight to sadists, those sub-sub-enligh­ten­men­ta­rians, who also never for­get to bring with them a scal­pel. For what could be of more delight to a sadist than a face that in a few minutes can write a dozen very clear books about exqui­site and sur­pri­sing varie­ties of pain ?

to resolve a face’s contra­dic­tions

Do not for­get the face that looks like its oppo­site : the face of a che­ru­bic CEO, or a vil­lai­nous and some­times demo­nic face on a per­son who it vir­tuous, or a lan­guid face on a fire­brand, or an angry face on a per­son who is most­ly indif­ferent, or a stu­pid face on a very bright per­son, or an ugly face on en attrac­tive per­son, or some com­bi­na­tion of the above––a vil­lai­nous stu­pid face on a bright and vir­tuous per­son, an ugly che­ru­bic face on a sexy CEO. These faces present those who look upon them with a chal­lenge of inter­pre­ta­tion : should you believe the face, or should you believe the condi­tion of per­so­na­li­ty under the face ? Or, if there is a third option, is any man­ner of belief about the face only in fact belief about a condi­tion in which the face is oppo­site to itself ?

These faces are of par­ti­cu­lar desi­ra­bi­li­ty to the sus­pi­cious, like Platonists, or fans of the idea of false conscious­ness, or admi­rers of Freu. Such a desire-er of faces might want to wash off the accu­mu­la­tion of mis­lea­ding fle­shy evi­dence that is a person’s face, so as to reveal wha­te­ver kind of truer, demys­ti­fied thing exists under it.

Similarly, these faces attract the humans who like to be righ­ters of wrongs, figh­ters against injus­tices, expo­sers of truths, and see­kers of reme­dies. If I am a mir­ror enough, the expo­ser of truth thinks to her­self (making her habi­tual error of thought), the face itself will trans­form in res­ponse to the vera­ci­ty of my reflec­tion : what is vir­tuous, if I reflect it, will soon appear with vir­tue, what is evil will be revea­led !

But among the refor­mers who like these faces, there is ano­ther sort of per­son who might gaze upon these faces with a dif­ferent inter­est. These are the rough dia­lec­ti­cians, always loo­king for the contra­dic­tion. How inter­es­ting, they think, and what could it mean for his­to­ry, that a face is wrong for itself in a time in which all is also so wrong. The ani­mals sit for­lorn or ride sub­ways in city cen­ters. The water has become poi­son. The old behave like the young, and the young are too wor­ried to move. Pilotless wea­pons have the name of birds, so why shouldn’t faces, also, lead away from the facts ? To the lovers of the contra­dic­tion, these faces are a per­fect account of our time : the poe­try of the wrong.

I have often thought that the faces do not reveal the per­son but rather the condi­tions in which all things are the oppo­site of what they appear to be would become most inter­es­ting in a death mask. With the per­so­na­li­ty gone, would the face that was always untrue final­ly be made the truth ? And what do we do with a contra­dic­tion when its only reso­lu­tion is that half the facts are remo­ved ?

  1. Fourier belie­ved that the per­fect work for very young chil­dren was sor­ting peas : « The thing to be done is to sepa­rate the smal­lest peas for the swee­te­ned ragout, the medium ones for the bacon ragout, and the lar­gest for the soup. The child of thir­ty-five months first selects the lit­tle ones which are the most dif­fi­cult to pick out ; she sends all the large and medium ones to the next hol­low, where the child of thir­ty months shoves those that seem large to the third hol­low, returns the lit­tle ones to the first, and drops the medium grains into the bas­ket. The infant of twen­ty-five months, pla­ced at the third hol­low, has an easy task ; he returns some medium grains to the second, and gathers the large ones into his bas­ket. »
« Erotology III : Categories of Desires for Faces »
A hand­book of disap­poin­ted fate
Ugly Duckling 2019
p. 90–97